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n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TODD KILBY, 
Petitioner, — 
-and- CASE NO. C-5355 
MONROE 2 - ORLEANS BOCES, 
Employer, 
-and-
THE ELEMENTARY SCIENCE PROGRAM 
ASSOCIATION OF MONROE 2 - ORLEANS 
BOCES, UAW LOCAL 1097, UNIT 6, 
; 
Intervenor. 
TODD KILBY, for Petitioner 
LINDA VAN COSKE, ESQ., for Employer 
JOHN HUBER, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 20, 2003, Todd Kilby (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of The Elementary Science Program Association of Monroe 2 - Orleans 
BOCES, UAW Local 1097, Unit 6 (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for 
employees in the following unit: 
) 
Included: All regular full-time and part-time Elementary Science Program Kit 
Processors and Stock Clerks/Couriers. 
Excluded: All Supervisory, Managerial and Office Clerical Employees of the 
Elementary Science Program. 
Upon consent of the parties, an on-site election was held on February 19, 2004. 
The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit who 
cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: March 26, 2004, 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
M* Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
1/ Of the 24 ballots cast, 4 were for representation and 20 against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SYRACUSE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-~ancP CASE NO. C-5191 
SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
SYRACUSE ASSOCIATION OF MANAGERS 
AND SUPERVISORS, SAANYS, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES D. MATHEWS, for Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. 
(DAVID W. LARRISON of counsel), for Employer 
LOUIS J. PATACK, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions by the Syracuse Teachers Association 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the 
Association's petition for certification/decertification which sought to add the reclassified 
title of Cook Manager to its bargaining unit of food service employees of the Syracuse 
City School District (District) and to decertify the Syracuse Association of Managers and 
) 
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Supervisors, SAANYS (SAANYS). The District had placed the reclassified title into the 
bargaining unit of managers and supervisors represented by SAANYS. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in 
finding that the reclassified title was encompassed within the scope of the SAANYS unit, 
that the ALJ applied the incorrect uniting standard, and that the ALJ erred in not 
permitting the Association to develop the record with regard to community of interest of 
the at-issue title with titles in its bargaining unit. 
The District and SAANYS have filed responses in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we remand the case to the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) for further processing. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only as 
necessary for our discussion of the exceptions. 
The District's agreement with the Association covering the period July 1, 2000 
through June 30, 2003 recognized "all employees in Unit 7 (Food Service)."2 Prior to 
January 2002, the last time the title of Cook Manager was mentioned was in an 
addendum to the Association's 1981 collective bargaining agreement with the District. 
Addendum 1 to the 1981 agreement recognized that, under certain circumstances, 
cooks assigned a school with a self-contained kitchen that provides services to that 
1
 36 PERB 1J4017 (2003). 
2
 Joint Exhibit 7. 
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school only would be responsible for the supervision and management of the food 
service operation of that school as a "Cook Manager," under the general direction of the 
School Lunch Manager. 
The District's subsequent agreements with the Association have omitted any 
reference to the title of Cook Manager. 
The civil service job descriptions jointly offered into evidence identify the titles of 
Cook I, Cook II and Cook Manager. The title of Cook II first appeared in the January 1, 
1992 SAANYS collective bargaining agreement with the District and has been included 
in all of their successive agreements. The last agreement to include this title was July 
1, 2000 to June 30, 2003. 
On January 15, 2002, the County of Onondaga Civil Service Commission 
reclassified, at the District's request, the title of Cook II to the title of Cook Manager. 
One of the District's witnesses, Cindy Bonura, Food Service Director, testified that she 
initiated the reclassification on behalf of the District because there was a need to reduce 
the requisite number of years of food-service experience to qualify for the job. There 
was no change in duties between the Cook II and Cook Manager titles. This was 
confirmed by the Association's witness, Andrew Pascale, who formerly held the title of 
Cook II and is now holding the reclassified title of Cook Manager. Bonura further 
testified that there are no supervisory or administrative differences in duties between 
Cook II and Cook Manager. 
The distinguishing feature among the title of Cook I, Cook II and Cook Manager 
is supervision. The Cook I job description places responsibility for staff supervision, 
inspections, testing and menu preparation in a higher-level cook or food service 
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supervisor. The titles of Cook II and Cook Manager both include responsibility for 
supervision over the lower-level titles working in food service, such as Cook I, Baker 
and Food Service Helper. 
The recognition clause of the SAANYS' 2000-2003 agreement with the District 
not only includes the title of Cook II, but also contains a requirement in Article 1.4 that 
". . . when existing positions are reclassified pursuant to civil service law, the District will 
consult with [SAANYS] in determining whether the new or reclassified title should be 
included in the bargaining unit as defined above." The recognition clause of the 
Association's collective bargaining agreement omits any reference to the reclassification 
of existing positions. 
On March 6, 2002, the Association filed a petition for certification/decertification 
with PERB. The petition alleged that: 
[0]n or about February 12, 2002, the Petitioner was notified by the 
District that the newly-recreated title of Cook Manager has been 
placed in Unit #11 [SAANYS].. . Petitioner seeks to remove the 
title of Cook-Manager from Unit #11 and place it in Unit #7.3 
At the hearing held on April 3, 2003, the Association stated to the ALJ that the 
dispute "focused" on the District's placement of the title of Cook Manager in the most 
appropriate bargaining unit. In response, the ALJ asked the petitioner whether the 
issue was one of fragmentation or placement of a new title. The petitioner 
acknowledged that the issue was placement of a new title.4 
3
 ALJ Exhibit #1. 
4
 Transcript p. 23. 
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At the conclusion of the first day of hearing, the ALJ adjourned the proceedings 
in order to review the transcript. The ALJ advised the parties that, since it was a 
representation proceeding, he would determine whether a more detailed offer of proof 
would be required from the Association. On May 12, 2003, the ALJ requested that the 
parties submit offers of proof, in the form of affidavits, as to any additional evidence they 
would present if the investigation were to continue at a subsequent hearing date. After 
review of the additional affidavits, the ALJ determined that the record was sufficiently 
developed and rendered his decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Representation proceedings are fundamentally investigations conducted 
pursuant to §201.9 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules).5 The petition in the instant 
matter was filed by the Association as a certification/decertification petition and sought 
to remove the title of Cook Manager from the bargaining unit represented by SAANYS 
and include it in the Association's bargaining unit. 
At the hearing, however, the Association confirmed to the ALJ that the petition 
was not grounded in PERB's fragmentation standards which generally require 
compelling evidence of the existence of a conflict of interest or inadequate 
representation of the title by its current bargaining agent.6 The Association's theory of 
the case was that it should be decided using PERB's unit placement standards, which 
would warrant the inclusion of the allegedly new title of Cook Manager in the 
Association's unit. 
5
 See Matter of Halley, 30 PERB 1J3023 (1997). 
6
 See State of New York (Long Is. Park Recreational and Historical Preservation 
Comm.), 22 PERB j[3043 (1989). 
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The form of the petition denotes the position of the party and the relief sought.7 
Once the District placed the title of Cook Manager into the SAANYS' unit, the 
Association initiated a petition for certification/decertification. Notwithstanding the form 
and procedure selected by the Association, the apparent purpose for the petition was 
placement of the title of Cook Manager into the Association's unit, not fragmentation of 
the title from SAANYS' unit. Under the circumstances, a petition for unit placement 
would have been the proper method to challenge the District's action. Regardless of 
the Association's clearly stated position that it was seeking a placement determination, 
the ALJ decided the matter using the unit clarification standard. 
The criteria used in deciding a certification/decertification or unit placement 
petition differ markedly from the criteria used to decide a unit clarification petition. A 
certification/decertification or unit placement petition commences an investigation and 
an application of the statutory uniting criteria. Then, an assessment must be made as 
to the community of interest shared by the at-issue title and the titles in the petitioned-
for unit, including the potential for conflict of interest.8 A unit clarification petition seeks 
only a factual determination as to whether a job title is actually encompassed within the 
scope of the petitioner's unit.9 Since the matter came before the ALJ as a 
certification/decertification petition, we find that the ALJ did not complete an 
investigation into the statutory uniting criteria, but rather, incorrectly employed the 
standards used to determine unit clarification without apprising the parties of his 
7
 See Rules §201.2(a), (b). 
8
 See Regional Jr. Serv. Inc., 35 PERB1J3022 (2002). 
9
 State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), 24 PERB P019 (1991). 
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intentions. While it is true the ALJ solicited from the parties offers of proof as to the 
evidence that they intended to introduce at a further hearing, the ALJ never advised 
them that this type of dispute implicated unit clarification standards, or that he intended 
to convert the certification/decertification petition to a unit clarification petition and apply 
such standards. Such an omission raises due process concerns because the affected 
parties were not provided with enough information to respond accordingly.1 ° 
We find, therefore, that the matter should be remanded to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A^AbMt, Memfcer 
10
 See State Admin. Procedure Act §301.2(c), (d). See, e.g., Alvarado v. State of New 
York, 110 AD2d 583 (1s t Dep't 1985) (Statutory notice held insufficient and failed to 
meet constitutional due process standards). 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Employer, 
: a n d _ CASE NO. R-067 " 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (LOCAL 830), 
Petitioner, 
- and -
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP (M. DAVID ZURNDORFER of counsel), for 
Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By order of this Board dated December 12, 2002,1 we rescinded our prior 
decision2 establishing, pursuant to §212 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
1
 County of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3040 (2002). 
) 2 County of Nassau, 15 PERB P009 (1982). 
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(Act), the County of Nassau Public Employment Relations Board (Nassau PERB) and 
ordered that all matters pending before the Nassau PERB be forwarded to this Board 
for further processing. 
This case comes to us pursuant to that order, which was not appealed by any 
party. 
FACTS 
On or about February 14, 2000, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 830) (CSEA), filed a unit placement petition with 
Nassau PERB to include Deputy County Attorneys (DCAs) employed by the County in 
its unit of approximately 11,000 other County employees. On August 2, 2000, the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), made a demand upon Nassau County to 
voluntarily recognize PEF as the employee organization designated to represent the 
DCAs for all purposes under the Act. By letter dated September 18, 2000, Richard J. 
Roth, a hearing officer appointed by Nassau PERB, wrote to PEF advising it that CSEA 
had filed a unit placement petition. Roth then suggested that PEF file a petition for 
certification with Nassau PERB, together with a showing of interest, so that the two 
petitions could be consolidated for hearing. On or about December 1, 2000, PEF filed its 
petition for certification with Nassau PERB. 
A hearing was held on December 13, 2000, at which time the County produced 
evidence that it employed approximately 60 DCAs. A subsequent hearing was held on 
June 27, 2001 to address the impact of the dissolution of the County's Office of Labor 
Relations and the resulting transfer of labor relation functions to the County Attorney's 
office. On or about September 6, 2001, Roth issued his recommendation, finding that 
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there should be a separate unit of DCAs, excluding two DCAs as managerial or 
confidential employees, and directing that an election be held. 
On September 17, 2001, CSEA filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision 
with Nassau PERB. PEF and the County were granted an extension to November 9, 
2001 to file their cross-exceptions, which both did.3 Nassau PERB took no further 
action regarding this matter. , 
Shortly after Roth's September 2001 decision, the Office of the County Attorney 
was reorganized under the direction of the new County Attorney, Lorna Goodman, who 
was appointed to the position on or about January 2, 2002. Significantly, the County 
alleges in its motion to reopen, discussed infra, that the County has reduced its reliance 
on outside counsel and increased the number of DCAs from 50 in 2000 to 85 in 2003. 
The increase in staffing has also resulted in an increase in the duties and 
responsibilities of the County Attorney's Office, which have been apportioned among 
the current DCAs and Bureau Chiefs. The County points out also that only 25 of the 
current staff of 85 were employed as DCAs by the County Attorney's Office in 
December 2000, when PEF filed its representation petition in the instant proceeding. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
On April 5, 2000, while the instant case was pending, CSEA filed a petition with 
this agency, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), pursuant to §203.8 of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), seeking review of the provisions and procedures of the 
Nassau PERB. CSEA claimed that the Nassau PERB had been unable to implement its 
procedures and sought to have PERB rescind its 1982 order approving the Nassau 
3
 PEF and CSEA have moved to dismiss the County's cross-exceptions as untimely. 
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PERB's provisions and procedures. On September 23, 2002, the Nassau County 
Legislature, by local ordinance, repealed the 1982 ordinance establishing the Nassau 
PERB. By our decision of December 12, 2002, we determined that the County's action 
had rendered moot CSEA's petition, we rescinded our prior order approving the Nassau 
PERB and ordered all pending matters before Nassau PERB transferred to PERB. 
By letter dated January 6, 2003, PEF requested that PERB issue a decision in 
the instant matter. Subsequent to this correspondence, in order to clarify the record and 
the issues before us, PERB's Deputy Chairman and Counsel requested that the parties 
stipulate to the record before Nassau PERB. Since the parties were unable to stipulate 
to the contents of the record, PERB assigned this matter to its Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) for further investigation in 
accordance with our Rules. 
The Director assigned the investigation to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
who scheduled two conferences with the parties. During the second conference, the 
ALJ, unable to obtain a stipulation as to the record's contents, directed the parties to file 
motions setting forth their respective positions concerning the disposition of this matter. 
The ALJ, thereafter, returned the matter to the Board for disposition. 
The County has moved to dismiss the petitions or, in the alternative, reopen the 
hearing on the grounds of change in circumstance. The County's motion is supported 
by an affidavit of County Attorney Goodman. PEF and CSEA oppose the motion and 
seek a decision of this Board on the exceptions filed to Roth's decision. 
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DISCUSSION 
The disposition of a case transferred to us from a local PERB is one of first 
impression.4 Part 203 of the Rules governs our review of local government procedures 
enacted pursuant to §212 of the Act. When a local PERB is functioning, §212 of the Act 
does not provide PERB with jurisdiction for de novo review of a decision made by a 
local PERB. PERB's role in such a situation is merely to ensure that the local PERB's 
procedures are substantially equivalent to the Act. However, in our view, the dissolution 
of Nassau PERB is analogous to a situation where there is no local PERB and PERB 
has original jurisdiction.5 It is as if this case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of 
one of PERB's ALJs or the Director. 
The Roth decision is before us on exceptions filed by the parties. Our initial 
review of the record upon which Roth based his decision revealed some factual 
discrepancies that the parties were thereafter unable to resolve when conferencing with 
the PERB ALJ assigned for that purpose. In such a case, where a representation issue 
is before us on appeal and we find that the record is not sufficiently clear to enable us to 
render a decision, we have remanded the matter to the Director or the assigned ALJ for 
further development of the record.6 
4
 In other cases where we have rescinded our orders that established local PERBs, the 
records before us did not evidence that there were any matters pending before those 
local PERBs. Here, the record before us contained evidence that there was a pending 
matter that had not been decided by the Nassau PERB. 
5
 Our remedial order of December 12, 2002 in County of Nassau, note 1, at 3111, 
supra, ordered that "any and all matters pending before the Nassau PERB be forwarded 
to this Board for further processing." 
) 6
 See State of New York (PEF), 36 PERB 1J3007 (2003). 
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Further, the County in its motion to reopen raises the issue that in the intervening 
years since Roth's decision was issued, the County Attorney's Office has undergone a 
major reorganization that has resulted in a change in job assignments, titles, duties and 
an increase in staff size. These developments are all relevant to our inquiry into whether 
these employees are exempt from representation (managerial and/or confidential) as 
the County argues or, conversely, our inquiry as to what is the most appropriate unit for 
purposes of representation. We have previously remanded a representation matter to 
the Director or the assigned ALJ for the limited purpose of taking evidence about 
changes in title, duties and unit structure while a petition is still being processed.7 
Such should be the case here. There are factual discrepancies in the record 
before Nassau PERB the resolution of which are necessary to our decision on the 
exceptions and the motions before us. As the parties have been unable, or unwilling, to 
resolve those factual discrepancies,8 the matter must be remanded to the Director for 
assignment to an ALJ to conduct a hearing on those issues. Further, during the 
processing of this matter, it is alleged that there has been a significant reorganization of 
the County Attorney's office with an increase in the number of employees covered by 
the petition, a change in job titles and in job duties. It is, therefore, appropriate in this 
ongoing investigation to take evidence on these issues as well. 
We grant the County's motion to reopen the hearing and deny the County's 
motion to dismiss, without prejudice. The matter is, therefore, remanded to the Director 
for further processing consistent with this decision. Based upon our determination, we 
7
 See Town of Greece, 25 PERB 1J3047 (1992). 
8
 See letters of Deputy Chairman and Counsel dated February 7, 2003 and April 10, 
2003; ALJ letter dated September 29, 2003; and letter from counsel for Nassau County 
dated October 15, 2003. 
Board - R-067 - 7 
do not reach the exceptions raised by the County, CSEA and the Response thereto 
from PEF. The exceptions as filed, and such other exceptions as may be filed pursuant 
to a decision on remand, may be raised to us at the appropriate later date. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 2004 
Albany, New York -^^U^^CL^^ 
/
 Marc A. Abbott, Member 
'John T. Mitchell, Member 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-23556 
UNITED FEDERATION OF-TEAGHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,1 
Employer. 
SHELLMAN D. JOHNSON, for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA ELENA GONZALEZ), 
for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH (MICHELE A. BAPTISTE, of counsel), for Employer 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes before us on a motion by Sara-Ann P. Fearon for an 
interlocutory appeal of a ruling of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) after the hearing of 
the instant charge. The ALJ denied Fearon's motion to amend her charge to include an 
additional allegation that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) also breached its 
duty of fair representation by failing to respond to Fearon's correspondence dated July 
1
 Fearon's employer, the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York, is a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). 
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4, 2002. Fearon unsuccessfully made the same motion before the conference ALJ 
resulting in the prior interlocutory appeal. The Board denied that appeal without 
prejudice to Fearon's right to appeal the ALJ's final determination.2 
FACTS 
The improper practice charge, as amended, was filed on August 2, 2002. At the 
pre-hearing conference held on February 3, 2003, Fearon disagreed with the ALJ's 
assessment of the charge and argued that UFT also failed to respond to her letter of 
July 4, 2002. The ALJ ruled, inter alia, that the allegation regarding the July 4, 2002 
letter was untimely. Fearon, by way of motion, initiated an interlocutory appeal that was 
denied by the Board on May 7, 2003. 
Hearings were held on October 28 and 30, 2003, at which time Fearon renewed 
her motion before the hearing ALJ to amend the charge to include UFT's failure to 
respond to the July 4, 2002 letter. The motion was denied because it was time-barred. 
Fearon took exception to the ALJ's ruling and the ALJ noted the exception for the 
record.3 Fearon presented her case. The ALJ then denied UFT's motion to dismiss 
and UFT presented its case. At the conclusion of the hearing, UFT again moved to 
dismiss the charge and the ALJ reserved decision. The instant appeal ensued. 
DISCUSSION 
Fearon argues, in support of her motion, that the ALJ "engaged in immediate 
prejudicial action when she precipitously denied Fearon's motion to amend her charge 
without hearing on the motion." We disagree. 
2
 36 PERB 1J3023 (2003). 
3
 Transcript, pp. 9-10. 
Board - U-23556 - 3 
The circumstances of this interlocutory appeal have not changed since our 
decision denying Fearon's prior interlocutory appeal. Fearon has not presented any 
extraordinary circumstances where severe prejudice would result. In any event, the 
ALJ's adverse ruling on the amendment to the charge is reviewable upon timely 
exceptions taken at the appropriate time. 
As we noted in our prior decision, our reluctance to review interlocutory 
determinations of a Director or an ALJ until the conclusion of a proceeding is to prevent 
delays inherent in piecemeal review of such proceedings. Here, the instant interlocutory 
appeal has only delayed the final decision in this matter and promoted inefficient use of 
administrative resources. We choose, ip our discretion, not to entertain this 
interlocutory appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, Fearon's motion is denied without prejudice to her 
right to appeal the ALJ's determination. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
<y "M /A / // "[A, u( 
" 'Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS - CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-22948 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE (ARTHUR Z. SCHWARTZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
! 
FREDERICK P. SCHAFFER, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE 
CHANCELLOR FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS (KATHERINE RAYMOND 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City University of New York 
(CUNY) and on cross-exceptions filed by the Professional Staff Congress-City University 
of New York (PSC) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by PSC, finding that CUNY violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing PSC's demand to bargain concerning 
the compensation and dispute resolution procedure aspects of a draft intellectual property 
policy. The ALJ dismissed that part of the charge that alleged that CUNY violated §209-
) a. 1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally implementing the intellectual property policy. But the ALJ 
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found that CUNY violated the Act when it refused to bargain during negotiations for a 
successor agreement PSC's demands to alter the contract provisions that CUNY relied 
upon as authority for its right to draft and implement the intellectual property policy. 
EXCEPTIONS 
CUNY excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that PSC 
had not waived its right to negotiate the draft intellectual property policy, pursuant to Article 
2 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement which expired on July 31, 2000, and in 
finding that CUNY refused to negotiate PSC's demand to revise the language of Article 2 
during negotiations for the 2000-2002 collective bargaining agreement. 
PSC cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that 
CUNY had the contractual right to implement the intellectual property policy, in finding that 
CUNY had not violated the Act when it refused to negotiate PSC's demands to negotiate 
the intellectual property policy in the Fall of 2002, in finding that two of PSC's demands 
with respect to the intellectual property policy dealt with non-mandatory subjects of 
negotiations, and in failing to order a restoration of the status quo as it existed before 
CUNY implemented the intellectual property policy. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision1 and will be repeated here only 
as necessary for our consideration of the exceptions and cross-exceptions. 
1
 36 PERB TJ4547 (2003). 
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CUNY has had in effect for over 30 years a copyright and patent policy applicable to 
faculty represented by PSC. In late 2000, CUNY established a committee made up of 
faculty and staff to review that policy and make recommendations. By letter from its 
counsel dated June 22, 2001, PSC made a demand to negotiate the intellectual property 
issues "which belong in collective bargaining" and have them resolved "in our current 
negotiations." At that time, CUNY and PSC were engaged in negotiations for a successor 
agreement to the one that expired on July 31, 2000. CUNY refused to negotiate those 
issues during contract negotiations, relying on the language of Article 2 of the collective 
bargaining agreement. In all relevant aspects, Article 2 has been in the parties' collective 
bargaining agreements since 1973. During the negotiations for the successor agreement, 
PSC also made proposals to change the language of Article 2.4(c) of the collective 
bargaining agreement, which provides in relevant part: 
The rights, functions and powers of the Board [of Trustees] and its 
officers and agents, and of the officers of CUNY, under the applicable 
law of the State and the Bylaws of the Board, including the Board's 
right to alter or waive existing Bylaws or policies in accordance with 
the procedures specified in the Bylaws shall remain vested in the 
Board and in said officers and agents, subject to the following: 
(c) In the event it is proposed that a Bylaw, procedure or policy 
respecting a term or condition of employment of all or some of the 
employees covered by the Agreement be adopted, amended or 
rescinded by resolution of the Board, the PSC shall be given notice 
and an opportunity to consult in respect of said action prior to said 
action being taken or becoming effective, in the manner specified 
below. . . . 
On June 5, 2002, the parties reached agreement on a contract with the term of 
August 1, 2000 to October 31, 2002. Prior to signing the agreement, PSC withdrew its 
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demands with respect to intellectual property and Article 2, stating that the withdrawal was 
"without prejudice" to the instant improper practice charge. 
On November 5, 2002, PSC sent a demand to CUNY to commence negotiations for 
a successor to the recently settled 2000-2002 collective bargaining agreement. At the 
outset, PSC demanded to negotiate the intellectual property policy. CUNY responded that 
the policy was not subject to negotiation, relying on the language of Article 2, and stating 
that Article 2 remained in effect until a new agreement was negotiated which changed the 
terms of Article 2. CUNY implemented the at-issue intellectual property policy on 
November 18, 2002. PSC's improper practice charge, as amended, alleges that CUNY's 
refusal to negotiate intellectual property issues violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ found that CUNY did not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
implemented the intellectual property policy in November 2002 because it had a 
contractual right to alter and implement policy under the terms of Article 2 of the expired 
collective bargaining agreement. We agree. The ALJ, however, found that CUNY violated 
§209-a.1(d) when it refused to negotiate the compensation and dispute resolution aspects 
of the policy on demand. The ALJ reasoned that CUNY had an obligation to bargain 
concerning the terms of the intellectual property policy after expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement, either prior to or subsequent to the implementation of the policy. 
The ALJ's rationale is that Article 2.4 cannot operate as a waiver in perpetuity of PSC's 
right to negotiate and that the clause is not a clear and unambiguous permanent 
relinquishment of PSC's rights to bargain over "mandatory subjects of bargaining not 
otherwise covered by the agreement". We reverse the ALJ's decision that CUNY violated 
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§209-a.1(d) when it refused to negotiate the compensation and dispute resolution aspects 
of the policy. 
We have consistently recognized that an employer's unilateral action relating to 
mandatory subjects that have been expressly settled by the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement do not trigger the statutory duty to bargain in good faith.2 The parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement may agree that certain matters fall within the authority of 
the employer to act without negotiations3 or, as in this case, after consultation with the 
union. Such clauses have been found to be a waiver by a union of its statutory right to 
bargain.4 Article 2.4 vests in CUNY the right to adopt and implement alterations to existing 
procedures or policies, upon notice to and consultation with PSC. We find that clause to be 
a waiver of PSC's right to negotiate such policy changes.5 
That the parties' collective bargaining agreement had expired at the time PSC was 
seeking to negotiate changes in the proposed intellectual property policy does not 
extinguish the waiver of PSC's right to negotiate those matters covered by Article 2. The 
ALJ found that while CUNY had the right to act unilaterally pursuant to Article 2 during the 
term of the collective bargaining agreement, CUNY was obligated to negotiate about 
mandatory subjects of negotiations, even if they fell within the purview of Article 2, once 
2
 County of Nassau, 18 PERB 1J3034 (1985); Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist, 13 PERB 
113014(1980). 
3
 County of Nassau, 26 PERB 1J3052 (1993). 
4
 Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 8 PERB 1J3011 (1975). 
5
 See City of Schenectady, 18 PERB 1J3035, at 3072 (1985), where the Board favorably 
cited to Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 NY 2d 493, 507 (1970): "Parties in 
voluntary agreement are not limited, except for rare matters contrary to public policy, from 
agreeing to anything they wish." 
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the collective bargaining agreement had expired and until a new agreement, incorporating 
the language of Article 2 was negotiated. We find, rather, that Article 2, which has 
continued virtually unchanged in every agreement between these parties for over 30 years, 
is a clear and explicit waiver by PSC of its right to negotiate policies and procedures 
covered by Article 2. Unlike cases in which we have held that a contract clause which 
constituted a waiver was limited to the life of the collective bargaining agreement,6 there is 
no language in Article 2, or elsewhere in the parties' collective bargaining agreement, 
which limits the effectiveness of Article 2 to the term of any collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Additionally, and as the ALJ found, while the collective bargaining agreement 
expires at the end of its stated term, by operation of §209-a.1(e) of the Act, all the terms of 
such an expired agreement continue until a new agreement is negotiated. Just as CUNY, 
or any public employer, may not alter or discontinue the term of such an expired 
agreement, so too, must PSC, or any employee organization, abide by the negotiated 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated. Absent language 
limiting a provision of a contract to the contract's stated term,7 neither party is free to 
choose which terms and conditions in their agreement it would deny continuation under 
law. 
As with any mandatory or nonmandatory subject of negotiations, the parties have 
been free to negotiate the continued inclusion or the removal of Article 2 from their 
contracts. To find that a clause in a negotiated collective bargaining agreement expires 
6See Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1f3038 (1995); Deer Park Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 28 PERB 1J3005 (1995); Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB fl3021 (1988). 
7
 Waterford-Halfmoon Union Free Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3070 (1994). 
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upon the end of the contract term, without any contractual language to that effect being 
present, would be to substitute our judgment for the intention of the parties and the 
Legislature.8 Article 2 prescribes a process for the parties to deal with policy issues such 
as those in the at-issue intellectual property policy. We treat that article as continued by 
operation of law, after the expiration of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. To do 
otherwise, would be to disrupt the status quo pending negotiations for a successor 
agreement. 
We find, therefore, that CUNY did not violate the Act when it refused to negotiate 
PSC's demands regarding the proposed intellectual property policy during either the 
negotiations for the 2000-2002 collective bargaining agreement or for its successor and 
reverse the ALJ's decision with respect to his finding that such action by CUNY violated 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Act. As CUNY had no statutory obligation to bargain with PSC over the 
proposed intellectual property policy, it likewise had no statutory obligation to bargain 
about the implementation of the policy and we affirm the decision of the ALJ in this regard. 
As we noted in Waterford-Halfmoon, id., at 3160: 
In ascertaining the nature of the parties' agreement, the 
character of the evidence necessary to establish an agreement 
to a term of a contract for purposes of §209-a.1 (e) is no 
different than the character of the evidence necessary to 
establish an agreement to any other term of an agreement for 
any other purpose under the Act. The mutual assent essential 
to the formation of an agreement can be established by 
evidence short of that which would establish a waiver of 
statutory rights. As with any agreement, a sunset agreement 
can exist in any circumstance in which it can be concluded 
reasonably that the parties intended to restrict or condition a 
given term of their collective bargaining agreement. 
Board - U-22948 - 8 
The ALJ also found that the refusal to negotiate PSC's proposals regarding Article 2 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act because a waiver or zipper clause such as Article 2 is a 
mandatory subject of negotiations. We reverse the ALJ's finding that CUNY violated the 
Act when it did not negotiate PSC's demands for revisions of Article 2 during the 
negotiations for the 2000-2002 collective bargaining agreement. There is no allegation 
contained in PSC's amended improper practice charge regarding negotiations about 
Article 2; the charge deals solely with CUNY's alleged refusal to negotiate the intellectual 
property policy. 
In any event, PSC was not privileged to enter into the 2000-2002 collective 
bargaining agreement with CUNY, which continued Article 2, and also unilaterally claim 
that it did so "without prejudice" to the pending charge before us. Parties who are 
negotiating may agree between themselves that a proceeding before PERB will not be 
affected by their agreement, but we are not bound by their terms. We reserve the right to 
determine the impact of their actions on the proceedings pending before us.9 Here, the 
PSC acted unilaterally in declaring its actions to be "without prejudice" to the instant 
proceeding. Without the consent of CUNY, that declaration is of no consequence and is 
certainly not binding on this agency. 
Based upon our decision herein, we need not reach the other cross-exceptions 
raised by PSC. 
We grant CUNY's exceptions and, accordingly, reverse that part of the ALJ's 
decision that found that CUNY violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by refusing to negotiate the 
) 9 See Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist of City of Buffalo, 22 PERB 1J3047 (1989). 
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draft intellectual property policy and by refusing to negotiate PSC's demands to revise 
Article 2 during negotiations for the 2000-2002 collective bargaining agreement. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the instant charge must be and hereby is 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
— — ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ - ^ M ^ ^ Z r 
Miotiael R. Cuevas, Chairman, 
/ / r . /./ 
/ Mal-c A. Abbott, Member*^ 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing as untimely its charge which alleged that the Police Benevolent Association 
of the New York State Troopers, Inc., (PBA) had violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused the State's demand to withdraw 
from fact-finding negotiating proposals dealing with discipline. 
The State was advised by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) that its charge, filed on October 8, 2003, was 
untimely, having been filed more than four months after the PBA submitted the at-issue 
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proposals to fact-finding on January 30, 2002.1 The State responded to the Assistant 
Director that the four-month period of limitations should run not from the date the PBA 
submitted the proposals to fact-finding, but from the date, October 1, 2003, that the 
State demanded that the PBA withdraw the at-issue proposals from fact-finding. 
The Director rejected the State's argument. He held that absent objection by a 
ch a rg i n g_pa rty„a siojxeg oti a b i I ityjat _th e j i m e_a_n oin mandatQryjDr„prohibitejd„subjejctjD.f 
negotiations is submitted to fact-finding, it is not an improper practice to submit a 
nonmandatory or prohibited subject to a fact finder for a recommendation. He further 
found that the charge was untimely as the State did not file within four months after the 
PBA's submission of the demand to fact-finding and that there is no "continuing 
violation" theory that has been accepted by this Board. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepts to the Director's decision, arguing, inter alia, that the time to 
file this improper practice charge should run from the date the State demanded that the 
PBA withdraw the at-issue demands from fact-finding, not from the date of the original 
submission of the proposals to fact-finding. The State further argues that the Director 
erred by treating a prohibited subject of negotiations in the same way as a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiations in deciding the timeliness of the instant charge. 
The PBA supports the Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record before us and our consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
1
 Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1 (a)(1). 
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FACTS 
On January 20, 2002, the PBA filed a petition with PERB's Director of 
Conciliation requesting fact-finding on certain items that were outstanding from the 
parties' prior negotiations. Included among those proposals were three that dealt with 
discipline.2 The State and the PBA thereafter participated in at least four sessions with 
the PERB-appointed factfinder. 
On August 29, 2003, Supreme Court, Albany County, held, in PBA of the City of 
New York v. PERB,3 that certain of the union's demands in that case that related to 
disciplinary records and procedures were prohibited subjects of negotiations because 
they were reserved to the discretion of the City Police Commissioner by virtue of the 
New York City Charter and the New York City Administrative Code. The State, based 
upon that decision, demanded on October 1, 2003, that the PBA withdraw from fact-
finding the at-issue proposals related to discipline because Executive Law §215(3) 
reserves matters of discipline to the Superintendent of the State Police and thereby 
renders the PBA's proposals prohibited subjects of negotiations. The PBA refused. The 
State thereafter filed the instant improper practice charge.4 
2
 Petition for Fact-Finding, PBA proposals 1, 3 and 5. 
3
 36 PERB 1J7014 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2003) (appeal pending), aff'g City of New 
York, 35 PERB 1(3034 (2002). 
4
 The State has also filed a declaratory ruling petition which seeks a finding as to the 
negotiability of the at-issue demands. That matter is still pending before an 
Administrative Law Judge. 
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DISCUSSION 
It is not until the final stages of the dispute resolution processes provided by the 
Act that an improper practice charge concerning insistence upon nonmandatory or 
prohibited subjects will lie.5 If there is no objection as to the negotiability of a demand at 
the time of filing the petition for fact-finding, it is not an improper practice to submit such 
a demand for a determination by the neutral.6 Under the Act, improper insistence, if any, 
occurs with the presentation of the nonmandatory demand to the fact-finder for formal 
recommendation over objection.7 As the State raised no objection at the time the 
petition was filed, its charge must be dismissed. 
We note further that our dispute resolution procedures also provide for the 
issuance of a declaratory ruling on the negotiability of a bargaining demand. In fact, the 
State has availed itself of that procedure with respect to the at-issue demands. We 
leave the parties to that proceeding to determine whether these demands are, in fact, 
prohibited subjects of bargaining. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the State's exceptions and affirm the decision 
of the Director. 
5
 Peekskill Cent. Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J3075 (1983); Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Ass'n, 
10 PERB H3029(1977). 
6
 Local 650, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 18 PERB 1J3015 (1985). 
7
 Peekskill, supra, note 5. 
) 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
JVltchael R. Cueyas, Chairman 
5 k A 
Marc^A, AlDboft, Member 
re 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
